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TORT LAW-SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY-NON-LIABILITY OF MI-
NORS-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that there is no
liability when a minor furnishes alcohol to another minor who is
subsequently injured due to intoxication.
Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d 888 (Pa. 1994).
Richard N. Kapres (the "Appellant"), a minor, was a student
at Clarion University, in Clarion, Pennsylvania.' On March 21,
1986, the Appellant attended three parties hosted by other mi-
nor students (the "Appellees").' After consuming alcohol at each
party, the Appellant walked home and was struck by an automo-
bile.' At the time of the accident, the Appellant's blood alcohol
level was 0.196%.'
The Appellant filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas in
Allegheny County against several minors alleging that he was
negligently served alcohol.5 He asserted that his intoxication
1. Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d 888, 889 (Pa. 1994). The Appellant was nine-
teen years of age. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890.
2. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 889. The Appellees were all under the age of twenty-
one. Id.
3. Id. at 889. The Appellant was returning to his dormitory at approximately
2:00 A.M. when he was struck. Brief for Appellant at 6, Kapres v. Heller, 640 A.2d
888 (Pa. 1994) (No. 0014). The Appellant suffered severe injuries and was sent by a
Life Flight helicopter to Allegheny General Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Brief for Appellant, at 6. He was hospitalized for seventeen days and then confined
to a wheelchair for approximately three months. Id.
4. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890. The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provides a
standard to determine whether individuals are intoxicated. See 75 PA. CONS. STAT. §
1547 (1982). The Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code provides that if "the amount of
alcohol by weight in the blood of the person tested is 0.10% or more," it shall be
presumed that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. 75 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 1547(d)(3).
Blood alcohol testing is conducted by measuring the alcohol level in the
bloodstream. Charles L. Winek & Francis M. Esposito, Antemortem and Postmortem
Alcohol Determinations 20 (1984). The results of the tests vary according to the
weight of the individual and the rate of absorption into the bloodstream. Id. For
example, if a 150-pound person consumes four drinks (a "drink" equals one 12 ounce
can of beer or an ounce of liquor) in one hour his or her blood alcohol level will be
0.10%. Id. at 20, 24. If that same person extended his or her consumption over a
three hour period, the blood alcohol level would be 0.046% (less than the legal level
of intoxication). Id. at 20, 23.
5. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has defined
negligence as "the want of due care which a reasonable man would exercise under
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was the proximate cause of his injuries.' The Appellees subse-
quently filed motions for summary judgment. The motions were
granted by the court of common pleas.8
The Appellant appealed the trial court's decision to the Supe-
rior Court of Pennsylvania.9 The superior court affirmed the
common pleas court's ruling."0 The court asserted that there
was no basis for imposing social host liability on individuals
under twenty-one years of age." The superior court determined
that individuals under the age of twenty-one were incompetent
to handle the effects of alcohol." Therefore, the court concluded
that minors did not owe a duty to other minors when furnishing
alcohol."
The Appellant argued that the minor defendants should be
the circumstances." Gift v. Palmer, 141 A.2d 408, 409 (Pa. 1958) (citing Finnin v.
Neubert, 105 A.2d 77, 78 (Pa. 1954)).
The minor Appellant initiated suit against multiple parties, of which only the
Appellees, who sponsored the parties, and were alleged to have actually furnished
the alcohol to the Appellant, were involved in this appeal. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890
n.3. The other original parties included the owners of the buildings that housed the
parties and an adult tenant of one of the apartments where a party was held. Id.
6. Id. Proximate cause is an element of negligence and is defined as a prima-
ry cause, uninterrupted by any intervening cause, which produces the injury and
without which the accident could not happen. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1225 (6th
ed. 1990).
Proximate cause has been defined by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania as
a limitation of damages resulting from a breach of duty. See Alumni Association,
Delta Zeta Zeta v. Sullivan, 535 A.2d 1095, 1098 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). The superior
court in Sullivan stated that "because of convenience, public policy, or a rough sense
of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain
point, as no longer a 'proximate' or 'legal' consequence naturally flowing from the
wrongdoer's misconduct." Sullivan, 535 A.2d at 1098. At some point along the causal
chain, the law makes a determination that liability will be limited. Id.
7. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890. Summary judgment is defined as a procedural
device used for dissolution of a controversy before reaching the trial level when
there is no dispute as to the material facts or where there is only a question of law
involved. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1435 (6th ed. 1990).
8. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890.
9. Kapres v. Heller, 612 A.2d 987 (Pa. Super. Ct.), affd, 640 A.2d 888 (Pa.
1994). The appeals from the several motions were consolidated by the superior court.
Kapres, 612 A.2d at 988.
10. Kapres, 612 A.2d at 992.
11. Id. at 991.
12. Id. The superior court adopted the rationale of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Congini. Kapres, 612 A.2d at 989 (citing Congini v. Porteraville Valve Co.,
470 A.2d 515, 517 (Pa. 1983)). Congini addressed the issue of whether an adult, who
served alcohol to a minor, to the point of intoxication, who was then subsequently
injured, could be held liable for such action. Congini, 470 A.2d at 517. The court in
Congini held that liability would exist on the part of the adult for serving alcohol to
one not capable of handling the effects of alcohol. Id. at 518. See notes 53-62 and
accompanying text for a further discussion of Congini.
13. Kapres, 612 A.2d at 991.
Recent Decisions
treated as adults.14 The Appellant noted that because the minor
defendants were over the age of eighteen, they were considered
adults under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure" and
also were subject to criminal prosecution for furnishing alcohol
under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code (the "Crimes Code")."
The superior court rejected this argument and concluded that
minors were deemed incompetent to judge the effects of alcohol
on others. 7 Therefore, the court determined that minors could
not be held liable for supplying alcohol to others. 8
The Appellant appealed the superior court's decision to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 9 The supreme court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a minor host could be liable under
the social host doctrine for injuries resulting from another
minor's intoxication.20 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania21
held that the social host doctrine was inapplicable when both
the plaintiff and the defendant were minors, and affirmed the
lower courts' decisions.22
The court began its analysis by noting that social host liability
did not exist where an adult served or furnished alcohol to an-
other adult.22 The court, however, indicated that liability could
exist in cases where an adult furnished alcohol to a minor.'
14. Id. at 989.
15. See PA. R. Civ. P. 76. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure defines a
minor as "an individual under the age of eighteen years." Id.
16. Kapres, 612 A.2d at 989 (citing Cengini, 470 A.2d at 517). The Pennsyl-
vania Crimes Code provides that "a person commits a summary offense if he, being
less than 21 years of age, attempts to purchase, purchases, consumes, possesses or
knowingly and intentionally transports any liquor or malt beverages." 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6308(a) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
17. Kapres, 612 A.2d at 991.
18. Id.
19. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 890.
20. Id. at 889. The court indicated that the social host doctrine is used to
designate a claim in negligence against a host who furnishes alcohol to a guest,
without requiring compensation. Id. at 889 n.1. Liability is imposed where because
of such intoxication, the guest is either injured or causes injury to another. Id.
The doctrine of social host liability was adopted in the case of Klein v.
Raysinger. See Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510 (Pa. 1983).
21. The majority opinion was written by Justice Cappy joined by Chief Justice
Nix, and Justices Zappala, Flaherty and Castille. Kapres, 612 A.2d at 891. Justices
Papadakos and Montemuro dissented and Justice Larson did not participate in this
decision. Id.
22. Id. at 889.
23. Id. at 890 (quoting Klein, 470 A.2d at 510-11). The supreme court in Klein
determined that adults who served or furnished alcohol to other adults were not
liable as social hosts. See Klein, 470 A.2d at 508. See notes 45-52 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Klein.
24. Kapree, 640 A.2d at 890. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania formulated
this rule in Congini. See Congini, 470 A.2d at 518. The court in Congini relied on
the Pennsylvania General Assembly's determination that persons under the age of
1995 795
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The court reasoned that the exception to the social host doctrine
was based on the presumption that minors were incompetent to
handle alcohol.25  As a result, the court concluded that
Appellant's attempt to recover damages for his injuries was
unfounded."
The Appellant argued that the court should hold Appellees to
the standard required of adults and treat the Appellant as a
minor." The supreme court rejected the Appellant's conten-
tions." The court asserted that because both the Appellant and
the Appellees were minors, both were incompetent to handle
alcohol.29 Therefore, the court observed that it could not hold
Appellees liable without holding the Appellant responsible for
his actions as well."0 The court concluded that a minor did not
owe a duty of care to another minor after furnishing alcohol."1
In dissent, Justice Papadakos addressed the apparent incon-
sistency that would result if minors were not civilly liable for
furnishing alcohol to other minors. 2 The dissent asserted that
because persons under the age of twenty-one were criminally
liable as accomplices for serving alcohol to other minors, liability
should also exist in civil litigation." The dissent suggested that
public policy required the imposition of liability in order to prop-
twenty-one years of age are incompetent to handle alcohol. Id.
The court reviewed whether the Appellees' motions for summary judgment
were properly granted. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891. The court indicated that the proper
standard of review for a summary judgment was whether "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories . .. show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Kapres,
640 A.2d at 890 (quoting Marks v. Tasman, 589 A.2d 205, 206 (Pa. 1991)). The
court reasoned that a thorough review of the social host doctrine was necessary in
order to determine if a genuine issue of material fact existed. Kapres, 640 A.2d at
890.
25. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891. The concept that minors were incompetent to
handle alcohol was first expressed by the legislature in section 6308(a) of the Crimes
Code and addressed by the supreme court in Congini. Id. (citing Congini, 470 A.2d
at 517).
26. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891.
27. Id. The traditional standard held adults negligent per se in furnishing
alcohol to minors. See Congini, 470 A.2d at 518.
28. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891.
29. id.
30. id.
31. Id. at 891. The court noted that a number of sister-state jurisdictions were
virtually unanimous in refusing to extend social host liability to persons who owed
no duty of care in furnishing others alcohol at social gatherings. See Congini, 470
A.2d at 517. The supreme court reaffirmed the holding of Congini for cases involving
the furnishing of alcoholic beverages from adults to minors. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891.
32. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 892 (Papadakos, J., dissenting).
33. Id.
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erly regulate the pervasive danger of alcohol abuse.'
The concept of holding social hosts liable for furnishing alco-
holic beverages did not exist at common law. 5 Liability for in-
juries caused by intoxication was first introduced in Pennsylva-
nia with the enactment of the Dram Shop Act (the "Act").' The
Dram Shop Act imposed civil liability on liquor licensees." The
Act created a statutory cause of action enforceable by anyone
injured as a result of another's intoxicated conduct.3 The Act
applied only in circumstances where the actor was visibly intoxi-
cated and was served additional alcoholic beverages by the li-
censee, prior to his injurious conduct. 9 The Dram Shop Act of
1854 was ultimately superseded by the Pennsylvania Liquor
Code (the "Liquor Code").'
The genesis of the social host liability doctrine in Pennsylva-
nia arrived with the supreme court's decision in Manning v.
Andy." In Manning, the court addressed the issue of whether
non-licensed individuals, who furnished alcohol to others free of
charge, could be held liable for any resulting injuries.42 The
Manning decision stemmed from injuries caused by intoxication
of a guest at a party, hosted by the guest's employer.' The
court held that only licensees, who were engaged in the sale of
alcoholic beverages, could be held civilly liable to injured parties."
34. Id.
35. See Cruse v. Aden, 20 N.E. 73 (111. 1889). The court in Cruse held that
"li]t was not a tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating liquors to a
strong and able-bodied man." Cruse, 20 N.E. at 74.
In Cruse, an intoxicated adult, while riding horseback, was thrown from his
horse, receiving injuries which ultimately resulted in death. Id. at 73. The decedent,
prior to the accident, was served two alcoholic beverages by the defendant, out of
"an act of mere courtesy and politeness." Id. at 74. The court held that because the
alcohol was given free of charge to an adult by another adult, the Dram Shop Act
did not apply. Id. at 76. Thus, the court resorted to the common law which had
determined that no liability existed for the act of furnishing alcoholic beverages. Id.
36. See 1854 Pa. Laws 663, Act No. 648, § 3 (codified as amended at PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (1969 & Supp. 1994)).
37. See 1854 Pa. Laws 663, Act No. 648, § 3. The name "dram shop" came
from the title used to address establishments that sold alcohol. BLACK'S LAW DICtIO-
NARY 494 (6th ed. 1990). A dram shop is a "drinking establishment where liquors
are sold to be drunk on the premises." Id.
38. 1854 Pa. Laws 663, Act No. 648, § 3.
39. Id. §§ 1, 3.
40. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (1969 & Supp. 1994).
41. 310 A.2d 75 (Pa. 1973).
42. Manning, 310 A.2d at 76.
43. Id. at 75.
44. Id. at 76. The court determined that to hold otherwise would create dif-
ficulties better left for the legislature to deliberate. Id.
The concurrence asserted that the Liquor Code was primarily concerned with
regulating licensees, thus providing remedies to those injured solely by such licens-
1995
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The issue of social host liability was addressed by the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania in Klein v. Raysinger" and
Congini v. Portersville Valve Company."6 In Klein, the issue was
whether liability should extend to a social host who served
drinks to a guest who intended to drive a motor vehicle and was
visibly intoxicated.47 Upon leaving the host's residence, the
plaintiffs car was struck from behind by another vehicle." The
court noted that some jurisdictions imposed liability upon social
hosts, but only in situations where a minor was served alcoholic
beverages from an adult host.49 These cases however were dis-
tinguishable because in Klein, both the host and the guest were
adults.' The Klein court, therefore, applied the common law
rule that consumption of alcohol, rather than the act of furnish-
ing it, was the proximate cause of the resulting injuries, provid-
ed both parties in the action were adults.5 The court held that
an adult host who furnished alcohol to another adult was not
liable for the resulting injuries.52
On the same day that the decision in Klein was rendered, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania imposed social host liability in
Congini v. Portersville Valve Co.' In Congini, the issue was
whether an adult, who served alcohol to a minor in a social
setting, could be held liable for injuries to that minor or to third
parties." The plaintiff was given alcoholic beverages by an
adult social host at an employee Christmas party.55 The plain-
ees. Id. at 77 (Pomeroy, J., concurring). Justice Pomeroy added, however, that liabili-
ty would exist where an individual served alcohol to an intoxicated guest and knew
that the guest would drive home afterwards. Id. The concurrence further noted that
social hosts should not be strictly liable under the Liquor Code because social hosts
were not members of the liquor industry and thus not within the classification of a
licensee. Id. The concurrence also indicated that no other court in applying the Li-
quor Code had imposed civil liability upon social hosts. Id.
45. 470 A.2d 507 (Pa. 1983).
46. 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983).
47. Klein, 470 A.2d at 508.
48. Id. Prior to this accident, the defendant had been served alcoholic bever-
ages at a residence and then was served alcohol at an inn. Id.
49. Id. The states of California, Illinois and Michigan all imposed liability
where a minor guest was served alcoholic beverages from an adult host. Id. (citing
Burke v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (Cal. 1980); Brattain v. Herron, 309
N.E.2d 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) and Thaut v. Finley, 213 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 1973)).
50. Klein, 470 A.2d at 508.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 510.
53. 470 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1983).
54. Congini, 470 A.2d at 516.
55. Id. The plaintiff in Congini was 18 years of age. Id. The plaintiffs car
keys were in the custody of the host. Id. When the plaintiff requested his keys at
the end of the party, the host, aware of the plaintiffs intoxication, handed over the
keys. Id.
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tiff later left the party and while driving home struck another
vehicle. 6 The plaintiff brought an action against the social
host, contending that the host was negligent both in providing
the plaintiff with alcohol to the point of intoxication and also in
surrendering the plaintiffs car keys. 7
In determining whether liability existed in situations involv-
ing minors, the court noted that the legislature had made it a
summary offense for minors to purchase alcohol."8 The court
asserted that this legislation indicated that the general assem-
bly had determined that persons under the age of twenty-one
were unable to handle alcohol.59 The court also noted that any
adult who furnished liquor to a minor would be held liable as an
accomplice.e
56. Id. at 516. The plaintiff suffered multiple fractures and brain damage re-
suiting in permanent disability. Id.
57. Id. at 516-17.
58. Id. at 516.
59. Congini, 470 A.2d at 517. The court asserted that the passage of Section
6308 of the Code in 1972 conclusively established that persons under the age of 21
were unable and incompetent to handle alcohol. Id. See note 16 for the text of Sec-
tion 6308(a).
Under the Crimes Code any person under the age of twenty-one who at-
tempts to purchase, purchases, consumes or transports alcoholic beverages is culpa-
ble. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(a). The court in Congini noted that the legislature's
motive in enacting Section 6308 of the Code was to protect minors, along with the
public at large, from the harmful results caused by furnishing alcohol to minors
from adults. Congini, 470 A.2d at 517.
The court noted that Pennsylvania courts had previously held that if a class
of persons was protected by a statute, any harm that befell the class, from any
breach of duty owed to them by others, who were not in that class, was negligence
per se. Id. (citing Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 205 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1965)). The courts of
Pennsylvania have adopted Black's Law Dictionary's definition of negligence per se.
See White v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Trans. Authority, 518 A.2d 810, 815 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1987). Accordingly, negligence per se is:
Conduct, whether of action or omission, which may be declared and treated as
negligence without any argument or proof as to the particular surrounding
circumstances either because it is in violation of a statute . . . or because it is
so . . . opposed to the dictates of common prudence . . . that no careful per-
son would be guilty of it.
White, 518 A.2d at 815. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 933 (5th ed. 1979)).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has established a standard for courts to
employ in determining negligence per se. Section 286 provides:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reasonable man the re-
quirements of a legislative enactment or an administrative regulation whose
purpose is found to be exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons
which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to protect the par-
ticular interest against the kind of harm which resulted, and (c) to protect
that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and (d) to protect
that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
60. Congini, 470 A.2d at 517. The court based this conclusion on Section 306
of the Crimes Code which provides that:
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The court in Congini reasoned that if an adult violated the
Crimes Code by furnishing alcohol to a minor who was subse-
quently injured by such intoxication, it would be considered
negligence per se.s" The court therefore held that an adult, who
served alcohol to a minor guest, would be liable for any injuries
proximately caused by the minor's intoxication."2
Several years after its rulings in Klein and Congini, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania expanded the doctrine of social
host liability in Orner v. Mallick." In Orner, adult social hosts
furnished alcohol to a minor who was subsequently injured."
The issue was whether a social host would be liable for furnish-
ing any amount of alcohol to a minor." Relying on Congini's
holding that adults owed a duty of care to minor guests, the
court in Orner found that a breach of that duty occurred with
A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense
if . . . with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the of-
fense, he: (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or
attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it ....
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 306(c)(1)(i)(ii) (1973).
61. Congini, 470 A.2d at 516.
62. Id. at 517. Additionally, the Congini court held that a minor, 18 years of
age or older, could be contributorily negligent. Id. (citing Kuhns v. Brugger, 135
A.2d 396, 401 (Pa. 1957)). The Kuhns court established three categories of negligence
for minors based on their respective age ranges. Kuhns, 135 A.2d at 401. The court
stated that:
Minors under the age of seven are conclusively presumed incapable of negli-
gence; minors over fourteen are presumptively capable of negligence, the bur-
den placed on minors to prove their incapacity; minors between the ages of
seven and fourteen are presumed to be incapable . . . (of negligence) . . . but
such presumption is rebuttable and grows weaker with each year until the
fourteenth year is reached.
Id; see also Commonwealth v. Zietz, 72 A.2d 282 (Pa. 1950); Quattrachi v. Pitts-
burgh Rys. Co., 164 A.2d 59 (Pa. 1932); Kehler v. Schwenk, 22 A. 910 (Pa. 1891);
Rasmus v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 67 A.2d 660 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1949).
Thus, because Pennsylvania has enacted a comparative negligence recovery
act, the degree of the minor's negligence will determine whether and by what
amount an adult defendant host may be liable based on the amount of damages. See
Congini, 470 A.2d at 519; see also 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (1982). In the course
of one day, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established that no liability would
result when adult hosts furnish alcohol to adult guests who later are injured as a
result of their injuries. Klein, 470 A.2d at 507. The supreme court contemporaneous-
ly established social host liability for adult hosts who furnished alcohol to minor
guests who subsequently injured a third party or who were themselves injured.
Congini, 470 A.2d at 515.
63. 527 A.2d 521 (Pa. 1987).,
64. Orner, 527 A.2d at 522. The plaintiff was a minor and attended three
parties where he was served alcohol. Id. at 521. The plaintiff was 19 years of age.
Id. Two of these parties were held at private residences and the third at a hotel. Id.
At the third party, the plaintiff was severely injured as a result of his intoxication.
Id. The plaintiff fell over a second floor railing and sustained multiple injuries to his
head. Id.
65. Id. at 521.
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the service of any amount of alcohol."6 The court, however, re-
manded the case to the trial court for a determination of causa-
tion.67
The supreme court thus enlarged the doctrine of social host
liability by concluding that a social host would be liable for pro-
viding alcohol in any amount to a minor guest.s Therefore,
rather than imposing liability only in cases where the minor
guest was intoxicated, liability was imposed regardless of the
quantity of consumption or the blood alcohol level of the minor
guest.6"
In 1988, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Jefferis v.
Commonwealth," developed a test to determine the extent of
social host liability when adults furnished alcohol to minors."1
In Jefferis, the issue was whether to impose social host liability
when a minor, upon being furnished alcohol at a fraternity par-
ty, was injured as a result of intoxication.72 The court deter-
mined that social host liability only applied if the adult intended
to furnish alcohol to a minor, in fact furnished that alcohol and
that the minor obtained the alcohol because of the adult's act.72
The court established this test on the basis of accomplice liabili-
ty for furnishing alcohol to minors. 4 Thus, the superior court
restricted the holding in Congini by imposing the requirement of
proving specific intent on the part of the adult host.7 As a re-
sult, the supreme court remanded the case to the trial court to
determine whether the adult intentionally rendered substantial
assistance to the minor guest.8
The social host liability doctrine in Pennsylvania was further
limited by the supreme court in Alumni Association v.
66. Id. at 523. The court established that the duty was breached even if al-
cohol was served to guests but not to the point of intoxication. Id.
67. Id. at 524.
68. Id.
69. Orner, 527 A.2d at 524.
70. 537 A.2d 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
71. Jefferis, 537 A.2d at 358.
72. Id. at 356.
73. Id. at 358. The court developed this test by synthesizing Section 306 of
the Crimes Code and the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id.
In a subsequent decision, the superior court added that in order for liability
to attach to an adult who furnished alcohol to a minor, the adult must have inten-
tionally rendered substantial assistance to the minor in providing for that minor's
consumption. See Goldberg v. Delta Tau Delta, 613 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. Ct.),
allocatur denied, 626 A.2d 1158 (Pa. 1992).
74. Jefferis, 537 A.2d at 358.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 358-59.
1995
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Sullivan." In Sullivan, a landowner, brought suit against a
fraternity for serving alcohol to a minor, who, while intoxicated,
started a fire that caused substantial damage to the landowner's
property.78 The issue was whether social host liability would
exist in situations where the defendant neither served nor fur-
nished alcohol to a minor.7"
The supreme court held that the host had to have actual no-
tice that the guest was consuming alcohol furnished by the
host."0 The court asserted that imputed knowledge was insuffi-
cient to establish social host liability." Based on this determi-
nation, the supreme court concluded that because the defendant
did not have actual knowledge of the minor guest's consumption
of alcohol, social host liability could not be imposed. 2
Approximately one year prior to the supreme court's ruling in
Kapres v. Heller, two decisions rendered in the commonwealth
court held that social host liability applied to minors who served
alcohol to other minors." In Muntz v. Pennsylvania Department
of Transportation,' the issue was whether social host liability
should be applied to persons under the age of twenty-one who
served alcohol to other minors." The minor plaintiff in Muntz
77. 572 A.2d 1209 (Pa. 1990).
78. Sullivan, 572 A.2d at 1210. The minor was an 18 year-old freshman at
Bucknell University. Id. at 1209. The minor consumed alcohol at two parties. Id.
One of the parties was in the minor's dormitory and the other was hosted by the
fraternity. Id. The fire was allegedly started by the minor and another guest at the
fraternity party. Id. at 1210.
79. Id. at 1209.
80. Id. The court mentioned that implementation of the substantial assistance
method would incorporate an imputed knowledge standard on the part of the defen-
dant social host. Id. Accordingly under that method, liability would be expanded. Id.
Therefore, the substantial assistance method was rejected. Id.
81. Id. at 1212. The court noted that the phrase "knowingly furnished," used
in Congini, had been interpreted in more than one way. Id. at 1212. The first test
was originated by the third circuit court in Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon. See
Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1163 (3d Cir. 1986). The test would
render liability where the host substantially assisted in the minor's consumption of
alcohol. Fassett, 807 F.2d at 1163. The court suggested six factors for determining
whether the host rendered substantial assistance. Id. at 1164. The Sullivan court
devised a more narrow test for determining social host liability. The court held that
liability would only be imposed in situations where the host actually knows the
minor was consuming alcohol. Sullivan, 572 A.2d at 1212. However, the court re-
marked that it would not restrict the application of social host liability solely to
situations where the host physically handed an alcoholic beverage to the guest. Id.
at 1212-13.
82. Sullivan, 572 A.2d at 1213.
83. See Muntz v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Transp., 630 A.2d 524 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1993); Sperando' v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Transp., 630 A.2d
532 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
84. 630 A.2d 524 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
85. Muntz, 630 A.2d at 525.
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consumed alcohol furnished by two minor defendants." The
plaintiff subsequently injured a third person." The court ruled
that holding a minor negligent per se for consuming alcohol but
not for furnishing alcohol to another minor was wholly inconsis-
tent with the current law."
The commonwealth court distinguished this case factually
from Congini. The court noted that in Congini, the parties
involved were an adult host and a minor guest, and that Muntz
involved a minor serving another minor." However, the Muntz
court did rely on the argument suggested in Congini that minors
could be held liable under a comparative negligence theory.9'
Thus, the Muntz court concluded that the apparent inconsisten-
cy could only be remedied by finding minors liable as social
hosts.s2
In Sperando v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Transportation,3 the issue was also whether social host liabili-
ty should be applied to a minor who served alcohol to other mi-
nors." The plaintiffs were injured when they were struck by an
automobile driven by an intoxicated minor. 5 The minor
plaintiff had previously been furnished alcohol by another mi-
nor.9" The commonwealth court asserted that social host liabili-
ty existed when one minor served alcohol to another minor.9
Thus, the plaintiffs' claim was remanded for trial to consider the
extent of the defendant's liability. 8
Despite the inconsistency prior to the Kapres decision, the
court in Kapres has set forth a consistent standard for Pennsyl-
vania courts to apply in the future. The decision in Kapres fol-
lows the rationale in Klein and Congini. The court in Klein de-
termined that adults were physically able to handle the effects
86. Id.
87. Id. The minor plaintiff injured a third person while driving under the
influence of alcohol. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Muntz, 630 A.2d at 525.
91. Id. at 526.
92. Id. In so holding, the Muntz court declined to follow the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania's decision in Kapres, which prohibited the imposition of social host
liability between minors. Id.
93. 630 A.2d 532 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993).
94. Sperando, 630 A.2d at 533.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court's decision was controlled by its previous decision in Muntz.
Id.
98. Id. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not address the decisions of
the commonwealth court in Muntz and Sperando when deciding Kapres.
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of alcohol.99 Following this, the court in Congini concluded that
minors were both physically incapable and mentally incompetent
to handle the effects of alcohol."'
The decision in Kapres followed this rationale in its develop-
ment of a third application of the social host doctrine. Since
minors were deemed incompetent to handle alcohol in Congini,
they were also unable to judge alcohol's effect on other minors.
Hence, a minor does not owe a duty of care to another minor in
the act of furnishing alcohol at a social setting due to this inabil-
ity.1"1 Therefore, according to the present reading of the social
host doctrine, minors who host a party will not face liability
stemming from the negligent acts of other minors who were fur-
nished alcohol at that party.
Social host liability is unique in its treatment of the negli-
gence of minors. The court in Congini asserted that an adult
host may assert contributory negligence as a defense to a minor
guest's cause of action.0 2 However, because minors lack a duty
of care to other minors, a cause of action for negligence may not
be made against a minor.
In contrast, according to the court in Kuhns, persons over the
age of fourteen are presumptively capable of negligence.' 3 Al-
though a minor is capable of committing a tort, under the su-
preme court's interpretation of the social host doctrine, a minor
cannot be held liable in negligence for serving alcohol to another
minor.l14
The decision in Kapres is prudent considering its alternative.
If civil liability were to be imposed upon minors, it is doubtful
the plaintiffs injuries would be properly and promptly compen-
sated. Minors, in most cases, are, by definition, insolvent. Unless
the injury occurs while the minor is driving the family car with
the permission of the parents, and the plaintiff can successfully
invoke the "Family Purpose Doctrine," the plaintiffs injuries will
go uncompensated.'
Holding a minor host liable, based on negligence per se, would
99. Klein, 470 A.2d at 510.
100. Congini, 470 A.2d at 517.
101. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891.
102. Congini, 470 A.2d at 517.
103. Kuhns, 135 A.2d at 401.
104. Kapres, 640 A.2d at 891.
105. See W. PROSSER & KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 73 at 524
(5th ed. 1984). The family purpose doctrine imposes liability on the parents for the
negligent conduct of minors while operating the family automobile. Id. However, the
operator of the vehicle must have the permission of the owner in order to hold the
owner liable. Id. at 525.
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not comport with the underlying rationale of negligence per se. If
a member of a protected class violates the statute protecting him
and brings an action against another minor who also violated
the statute, then the plaintiff and defendant are equally culpa-
ble."0 8 According to the Crimes Code, a minor, who possesses,
purchases or consumes alcohol, commits a summary offense. 7
The court in Congini held that the Crimes Code represented a
legislative decision to protect minors from the harmful effects of
underage drinking."8 Thus, if a social host served alcohol to a
protected member of that class, then the host would be liable
under negligence per se."°9
On the other hand, if the host was a minor, the host would be
held liable under the Crimes Code for possessing alcohol."'
The guest who receives the alcohol would also be held liable
under the Crimes Code for possession."' Therefore, if the guest
asserted a cause of action against the host, the guest would be
in the same position of culpability as the host." The supreme
court in Kapres followed a similar rationale."' The court deter-
mined that it was preferable to find no duty on the part of a
minor who furnished alcohol to another minor."4 Accordingly,
the court in Kapres properly decided the issue of social host
liability with regards to minors as parties to an action.
Pursuant to the court's ruling in Kapres, social host liability
only exists in one specific area of the law; namely where an
adult host furnishes alcohol to a minor guest."5 Imposing lia-
bility upon minors in order to decrease the staggering number of
underage drinkers may be an appealing public policy goal; how-
ever, in reality, imposition of liability lacks the deterring effect
necessary to bring about the desired change.
Jason G. Bates
106. See PROSSER, cited at 106, § 36 at 232.
107. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6308(a). See note 16 for the text of section
6308(a).
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